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Abstract 
 
In my thesis, Philip K. Dick's Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? is examined using 
French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan's mirror stage theory. In the novel, humans have built 
androids that are almost indistinguishable from humans except that they lack a sense of empathy, 
or so the humans believe. The Voigt-Kampff Machine is a polygraph-like device used to 
determine if a subject shows signs of empathy in order to confirm if one is an android or a 
human. Yet, should empathy be the defining quality of determining humanity? 
In his article "The mirror stage as formative of the function of the ‘I’ as revealed in 
psychoanalytic experience," Lacan refers to a particular critical milestone in an infant's 
psychological development. When the baby looks in a mirror, they come to the realization that 
the image they are seeing is not just any ordinary image; it is actually themselves in the mirror. 
This "a-ha" moment of self-realization is what Lacan's Mirror Stage Theory is based on. 
According to Lacan's theory, the image that the child sees in a mirror becomes an "Other" 
through which they will always scrutinize and pass judgment on, for it is not how they have 
pictured themselves to be in their mind’s eye. 
 I hypothesize that the androids are humans' artificial and technological Other. It is my 
thought that Dick uses the conflict of determining the biological from the artificial, the effort to 
differentiate humans from androids and biological animals from artificial ones, to illustrate 
Lacan's psychoanalysis of the mirror stage and its importance in our continual search for 
determining what humanity is and who we really are. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Philip K. Dick; Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?; Jacques Lacan; 
Psychoanalysis; Mirror Stage Theory; Posthumanism 
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Introduction 
 
In Philip K. Dick’s masterpiece 1968 science fiction novel Do Androids Dream of 
Electric Sheep?, World War Terminus has devastated the population of Earth and left the planet 
almost uninhabitable, compelling survivors to flee to Mars or one of several colony planets. The 
emigrants are given free android servants as an incentive to serve them in space. The androids 
are highly intelligent, sophisticated, and efficient machines; so much so that they are nearly 
indistinguishable from human beings. Occasionally, an android slave kills its master and flees 
Mars for safe haven on Earth. Thus, bounty hunters are employed by police agencies to protect 
the small but resolute communities of humans who reject emigration and those who cannot 
emigrate due to the harmful, unsafe effects of living on the post-apocalyptic Earth. The main 
character of the novel is one of these bounty hunters, named Rick Deckard. Throughout the 
course of the novel as he destroys or “retires” six of the aforementioned escaped androids, 
Deckard's sense of identity is shaken; he begins to question if he might be an android too and not 
a human like he is led to believe, due to his ever increasingly cold, distant nature: a trait that is 
believed to be embodied by the androids. 
 Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? explores the ethical implications of enslaving the 
androids and, more importantly, androids are used by Dick as a tool to analyze and identify the 
true essence of humanity. Humans claim that the androids do not possess empathy; therefore, 
humanity's essence must be in their sense of empathy, or so their logic dictates. In the novel, a 
polygraph-like device called the Voigt-Kampff Machine is used to determine if a subject shows 
signs of empathy in order to determine if the individual is an android or a human, yet the 
question remains, should empathy really be the defining quality of determining humanity? 
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 This all ties back into Deckard's anxieties about the androids and explains his uncertainty 
of what being human entails. As Dick himself stated,  
The purpose of this story as I saw it was that in his job of hunting and killing these 
[androids], Deckard becomes progressively dehumanized. At the same time, the 
[androids] are being perceived as becoming more human. Finally, Deckard must question 
what he is doing, and really what is the essential difference between him and them? And, 
to take it one step further, who is he if there is no real difference? (Grace)  
Hence, I propose that Dick uses the conflict of determining the biological from the artificial by 
the measure of empathy to illustrate Lacan's psychoanalytic theory of the mirror stage and to 
showcase the importance of mankind's continual search for determining what humanity is and 
who we really are.  
 In order to help confirm my hypothesis, some research questions I sought to answer are 
as follows: 1) What does the idea of humans wanting to own biological animals as pets instead of 
artificial ones tell us about the mindset of the characters in the novel? 2) How does it represent 
the dichotomy of humans versus androids, the notion that androids are not real people? 3) What 
does the artificial toad at the end of the novel symbolize about Deckard and his sense of identity 
and humanity? 4) Is the Voigt-Kampff Machine intrinsically flawed? 5) Are humans really any 
different than androids? 6) Why is Rick Deckard's sense of identity shaken due to his interactions 
with the androids? 7) Is Deckard a human like he is led to believe, or is he really an android as he 
begins to suspect? 8) Lastly, how is this all related to Lacanian psychoanalysis, specifically 
Lacan's Mirror Stage Theory? 
It is also interesting to note that Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic theories and Philip K. 
Dick's fictional works are both considered to be within the Posthumanism Movement. 
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Furthermore, in January 1966, "With the publication of Ecrits, a collection of [Lacan's] writings 
which includes the essay on the Mirror Stage, Jacques Lacan gains a wider audience among 
intellectuals," (Felluga "Lacan II: On the Structure of the Psyche"). Though his essay on the 
Mirror Stage was originally published in 1949, readers did not really take notice of it until the 
publication of Ecrits in 1966. Shortly thereafter, in 1968, the first edition of Philip K. Dick's Do 
Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? was published. It could be merely coincidence, but it is 
curious that there are so many parallels found in Lacan's and Dick's works and so many 
examples of Lacan's Mirror Stage Theory found within Dick's novel that one must wonder if 
Dick had the theory in mind when Dick wrote it, even if only in his subconscious. 
 
 
 
Lacan’s Mirror Stage Theory 
 
 In French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan's article entitled "The mirror stage as formative 
of the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience," he describes the mirror stage 
of a child's development as, "the transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes 
an image--whose predestination to this phase-effect is sufficiently indicated by the use, in 
analytic theory, of the ancient term imago," (Lacan 503). Additionally, according to the 
definition of the theory provided by the University of Hawaii's English Department, "...human 
infants pass through a stage in which an external image of the body (reflected in a mirror, or 
represented to the infant through the mother or primary caregiver) produces a psychic response 
that gives rise to the mental representation of an 'I' " ("Lacan: The Mirror Stage"). To clarify, 
Lacan refers to a milestone in an infant's psychological development in which when the baby 
looks in a mirror, they come to the understanding that the image they are seeing is not just any 
ordinary image, it is actually themselves in the mirror. This "a-ha" moment of self-realization in 
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early human development is what Lacan's Mirror Stage Theory is based on, and parallels 
Deckard’s questioning of who he really is and what the androids are in relation to humanity. 
Therefore, this real-life phenomenon is the foundation upon which the Lacanian psychoanalytical 
argument can be made to provide some insight into the questions raised throughout the novel.  
 Lacan's ideas that arose from his studies of the mirror stage are fascinating to say the 
least, though at times it can be quite challenging to comprehend. According to Lacan,  
  This... specular image by the child at the infans stage... would seem to exhibit in 
 an exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which the I is precipitated in a primordial 
 form, before it is objectified in the dialectic of identification with the other, and before 
 language restores to it... as subject. This form would have to be called the Ideal-I... 
  ...this form situates the agency of the ego, before its  social determination, in a 
 fictional direction, which will always remain irreducible for the individual alone, or 
 rather, which will only rejoin the coming-into-being...of the subject 
 asymptotically, whatever the success of the dialectical syntheses by which he must 
 resolve as I his discordance with his own reality. (Lacan 503) 
What this means is that an individual’s identity is a construct behind which the real subject 
remains hidden. The development of this identity, what Lacan calls the “Other,” happens during 
the Mirror Stage. The moment an infant looks in the mirror for the first time, whether 
figuratively or literally, is when the baby discovers the idea of the self. Before this happens, the 
child has no idea that they are an individual that can be separated from the world around them, 
and therefore there is no ego. Once the sense of self is discovered, this causes a split between 
one’s real self and the formation of the “I”, or the “Other.”  
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  When an individual discovers that the image in the mirror is of themselves, they further 
realize that it must be how others will perceive of them to be. Seeing the image of ourselves in 
the mirror for the first time and coming to this realization can be very shocking and thus can 
become a problem to the individual, since the image that one sees does not necessarily align with 
how they perceive themselves in their mind's eye. A person will then continuously strive 
throughout their life to bring that ideal self, or the Ideal-I, into fruition.  For Lacan, the identity 
we show to the world is not who we truly are, yet we continuously strive to control the “I” to 
show to others what we want to appear to be. The image in the mirror becomes this "Other", 
through which an individual will always scrutinize and pass judgment on, for it is not their ideal 
selves. 
 Using these same principles outlined above, I hypothesize that in Dick's novel Do 
Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (referred to hereafter as Androids), the androids are the 
humans' artificial and technological Other which humanity continuously scrutinizes themselves 
against. The androids thus perform the function of the mirror image of a human’s “self,” both on 
a societal scale, through the human characters in the novel, and on an individual scale, through 
the eyes of Deckard. We see this in action when Deckard wonders why he doesn’t feel any 
emotion when he retires the androids, and begins to question if he is in fact an android as well 
without knowing it. The anxiety that the humans have over the androids thus represents the 
dichotomy between the real self and the “I” or Other. Dick provides us with examples of this 
with the thematic battle between the biological versus the artificial.  
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Importance of Electric Sheep 
 One of the main thematic threads woven throughout the text of Androids is differentiating 
the biological from the artificial. This is overtly demonstrated in the use of the Voigt-Kampff 
Machine to determine a human from an android, but there are other instances that further this 
overarching theme. The conflict between the humans and the androids is in fact mirrored by 
humanity’s fascination with animals, or more specifically, the desire to own a “real” biological 
animal. Most importantly, due to the nuclear fallout from World War Terminus, biological 
animals are extremely rare and are highly coveted, much more so than artificial animals, though 
many humans cannot find nor be able to afford to buy a biological, or “real” animal. Therefore, 
artificial animals serve as a substitute for the “real” thing.  
While literary critics seem fond of analyzing the role that the androids play in Androids, 
there is far less scholarship examining the role that biological and artificial animals have in the 
novel. This is quite a shame, as one can explore the implications of a larger growing number of 
artificial lifeforms being taken care of by humanity, even if many humans’ concern for their pets 
is overshadowed by the fact that owning an animal seems to be a status symbol. What is 
important to note is that owning a pet, even an artificial one, can be seen as an outward sign of 
one’s empathy. This phenomenon of owning biological and artificial animals and the impact this 
has in the larger context of the novel is explored in depth by Brad Congdon in his thesis entitled 
Prophet of the Postmodern: The Problem of Authenticity in the Works of Philip K. Dick. 
Congdon reiterates this notion that, “owning an animal is an important status symbol; not only 
does it show off the owner's wealth, since animals are so expensive, but it also proves how 
empathetic the owner is. This second distinction is just as important as the first, since empathy is 
what separates man from android” (Congdon 41). The importance of owning and taking care of 
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an animal is established early in the narrative when Deckard's neighbor tells him: "You know 
how people are about not taking care of an animal; they consider it immoral and anti-empathetic" 
(Androids 10). For the humans in the novel, owning an animal is so important as a living symbol 
of their humanity that many who cannot own a biological animal will care for an artificial animal 
in place of a biological one, though it is not ideal.  
Animals are so important “as a symbol of both wealth and empathy, that virtually every 
character carries around Sidney's Animal & Fowl Catalogue, so as to correctly appraise the worth 
of real animals (and, presumably, their own humanity)” (Congdon 41). Deckard is also one who 
owns an artificial animal: in fact, he owns the “electric sheep” of the novel’s title, yet he still 
longs to own a biological animal. After retiring three of the six Nexus-6 android fugitives, 
Deckard buys his wife Iran a biological “authentic” goat with the reward money he earned. 
Unfortunately for him, after he threatens to kill Rachael and once he retires the three remaining 
androids, Deckard comes home to find Iran in grief over the goat being recently killed by 
Rachael. From these important plot points, it is crucial to examine the role that animals play in 
the novel, as much of the plot revolves around the desire and acquisition of animals; the 
biological and artificial animals are symbolic of the conflict between humans and androids, and 
this “mirrors” the struggle that Deckard has with his own ontological status. 
Quite remarkably, the artificial animals require the same amount of care as biological 
ones; humans have purposely programmed these animals to act like “real” animals in every way 
possible. Remarkably, these artificial animals bring to mind a real-life example: the 1990’s toy 
phenomenon Tamagotchi, a “digital” pet that a child would have to feed, clean, and play with in 
order for the pet to grow up into adulthood. In every way, one could see how a Tamagotchi could 
become a pet to a child. Children did grow fond of the tiny pixels that resembled an animal on 
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tiny computer screens, to the point that a child would make their parents take care of their pets 
when they could not bring them to school, as their pet might get sick and possibly die if not taken 
care of properly. In this way, it is easy to see how humans can get attached to artificial animals 
just as much as a “real” one. 
The artificial animals throughout the novel parallel the androids in that they are mistaken 
for their biological counterparts due to their striking resemblance to them. Even Deckard 
himself, who seeks out artificial lifeforms and retires them as his job, mistakes artificial animals 
for “real” ones throughout the course of the novel. This is quite problematic, and this issue 
parallels the implication that humans and androids could potentially be mistaken for one another 
as well. As Congdon notes: 
Deckard, who seems especially obsessed about animals, is even fooled twice by 
electronic animals: first, at the Rosen Foundation, where he mistakes an ersatz owl for the 
real deal, and then at the end of the novel, when he believes he has discovered an 
authentic toad. That he is so easily deceived despite the fact that both species of animal 
are known to be extinct is distressing, to say the least, when his business is telling the real 
from the fake, and a mistake of such magnitude in his line of work could lead him to 
retire a human being. (Congdon 41) 
This exploration of the implications of mistaking the artificial for the biological or “real” come 
to fruition by the end of the novel, in which Deckard brings home a toad that he found in the 
desert. After showing the toad to his wife, Deckard realizes that he had once again mistaken an 
artificial animal for a “real” one when Iran finds a control panel on the toad’s abdomen. The 
meaning of the ending scene with the artificial toad is explored in the article "Speciesism and 
species being in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?" by Sherryl Vint; here she posits that: 
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In the novel's final scene, Iran orders electric flies for the electric toad, a sign of love for 
her husband who is "devoted to it" beyond reason, beyond rationality, beyond 
reciprocity.... In this act of care for the electric toad (even though it has no economic 
status as it is not 'real') Iran and Deckard begin to find a way out of commodity fetishism. 
They are learning to treat the toad with kindness rather than as a possession because it is 
the social relationship--not the ontological status of the toad--that counts. (Vint 121) 
Though I believe that it is Deckard that genuinely wishes to care for the artificial animals and 
Iran cares more about her husband being happy, I agree with Vint in that the change that we see 
in Deckard is best seen through the lens of how he treats animals, and even though the toad is not 
biological, he still wants to genuinely take care of it. The final scene completes Deckard's story 
arc of realizing that humans and androids, the biological and the artificial, are not so different; 
how of little importance it is to try and make one superior to the other. Deckard finally sees that 
the artificial is not in fact inferior to the biological, whether that be animals or androids. As 
stated by Deckard, "The electric things have their life too. Paltry as those lives are." (Androids 
239). This mirrors his realization of human nature vs. the androids’ nature as not being so 
different from one another as he realizes how humans can be cold, distant, and have a lack of 
empathy while androids are also capable of being empathetic. 
While there seems to be a lack of analysis on the role that animals play in the novel, 
certainly, it is... 
...only by realizing the centrality of animals can we perceive all the implications of 
Deckard's change. It is not... that Deckard risks becoming increasingly like the androids 
through his work as a bounty hunter; rather, the risk faced by Deckard and other humans 
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in the novel lies in realizing that they already are android-like, so long as they define their 
subjectivity based on the logical, rational, calculating part of human being. (Vint 112) 
This ultimately brings up the question of Deckard’s nature, and just how he fits in with 
the conflict of the biological and the artificial. Within the text, Dick never explicitly gives the 
reader a clear answer on Deckard’s ontological status. The question remains: Is Deckard a 
human or android? Though I believe Dick leaves this question purposefully unanswered so the 
reader comes to their own conclusions, it seems to me that there is an added complexity and 
beauty to the story if one sees Deckard as an android. If Deckard is in fact an android, the ending 
seems to have an extra layer of meaning that would otherwise be absent. Eric Carl Link explains 
this added meaning to the ending by theorizing that: 
 It may be that Deckard’s desire to own and tend to the needs of a living animal is, 
beyond the status symbol a living animal would represent, a type of wish fulfillment: a 
means to connect at some deep level with another living creature. The ending of the 
novel, in which Deckard’s wife, Iran, notes that her husband is “devoted” to an electric 
toad, may itself hint at the empathic relationship between “electric” beings—Deckard and 
the ersatz toad in this instance. (Link) 
 Deckard as an android would show just how androids have learned to care for others, and have 
grown to understand their own emotions. It also would fit into the mirror stage theory quite well, 
as Deckard is seeing himself in the androids he is retiring, and he does not like seeing himself 
being a cold, heartless machine like the humans believe the androids to be. It also could explain 
why he becomes so devoted to the artificial toad at the end--maybe he sees himself in that poor, 
helpless toad on the side of the road and decides that it must need love and care just like he does. 
This would be quite a sight for the humans in the world of Androids--seeing an android, who has 
 11 
made a living out of destroying artificial lifeforms, genuinely care for an artificial animal, not as 
a commodity and status symbol, but to be “devoted” to it instead, seeing a genuine bond between 
two artificial beings.  
 
The Voigt-Kampff Machine 
As the main character Rick Deckard hunts down and "retires" the fugitive androids one 
by one, he slowly begins to question his own humanity. Deckard increasingly sees himself as 
dehumanized by becoming a cold-hearted killer. He realizes that the androids that he must retire 
are not so different from humans at all. Some of the androids’ behaviors indicate that there is 
more to them than Deckard and the humans recognize; some examples include Luba Luft, who is 
an opera singer who is fascinated with music and art; Roy and Irgmard Baty, who declare 
themselves husband and wife; and the fugitive Nexus-6 androids who seemed to have travelled 
around together, which surprises Deckard as androids aren’t known for working well in groups. 
So, if these are all false presumptions, how is Deckard to truly know if he has ever accidentally 
killed a human by mistake? Deckard is also a victim here, as he is programmed by society to 
believe these to be a part of an androids’ nature. Therefore, the fault of not being able to 
differentiate between a human and an android does not actually lie within Deckard, but within 
the parameters of the Voigt-Kampff test.  
The Voigt-Kampff Machine is a polygraph-like device that Rick Deckard and other 
bounty hunters use in order to test a subject’s level of empathy. This empathy test “is the bounty 
hunter's first (and seemingly only) tool for discovering [androids] within the general populace. It 
works by having the subject respond to a number of questions, each one worded so as to induce 
an empathetic response” (Congdon 47). The machine tracks the physical and verbal reactions to 
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questions which are supposed to trigger an emotional response. A lack of empathy in a subject 
leads the examiner to determine that the subject must be an android; empathy is the most 
significant trait which androids lack and humanity has therefore deemed it as the inherent nature 
of mankind. Yet, is empathy really the greatest, most essential quality of humanity? Is this the 
most effective test for determining a human from an android? 
These questions are addressed in Klaus Benesch's article "Technology, Art, and the 
Cybernetic Body: The Cyborg as Cultural Other in Fritz Lang's 'Metropolis' and Philip K. Dick's 
'Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?'", where the role that cyborgs and androids play in the 
works of Fritz Lang's Metropolis and Dick's Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? are analyzed 
according to Lacanian theory; specifically Benesch uses the Mirror Stage theory to highlight how 
Philip K. Dick shows the main conflict of differentiating humanity from androids using the 
Voigt-Kampff machine as being fundamentally flawed. Benesch suggests that because... 
  ...the test is devised according to a preset notion of what it means to be a machine, 
 that is, the lack of emotional responses, it is doomed to replicate endlessly the false 
 premises of the human observer.... the whole design rests on an inherent paradox: by 
 presupposing the disinterestedness and emotional aloofness of the experimenter, the 
 Voigt-Kampff scale betrays the same psychological markers as the non-person it seeks 
 to identify. 
  The difference, then, between artificial and "natural" existence does not originate 
 within the machine; rather it results from the paradoxical desire rampant in 
 technologically advanced cultures to define humanity against the technological as Other 
 and alien to human nature. It is thus... always the humans, and not the androids, who 
 dream of electric sheep. (Benesch 390) 
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Essentially, the notion that androids do not possess empathy and therefore humans must possess 
this trait is proven to be a falsehood as Deckard interacts with the androids more and more 
throughout the course of the novel, and it is precisely through the implementation of Lacanian 
mirror stage theory that Benesch determines that the test itself is irrefutably flawed. 
It is important to note here the fact that the androids look identical to humans in every 
way, physically speaking: "As with the androgynous characters,... we can neither be wholly 
assured of the visual markers of the human nor of those which define the identity of the cyborg. 
On the contrary, the very essence of the imagery of the man-machine turns on the fact that it 
resembles as much as it estranges the organic body" (Benesch 389-390). This makes the use of 
the psychological and physiological test of the Voigt-Kampff machine crucial in determining a 
human from an android, as there are no other reliable methods for differentiating the two species. 
The androids physically look identical to humans outwardly; this makes the androids, as in the 
Lacanian theory, humanity’s Other. In this case, they are the artificial, machinal or technological 
Other. "Similar to Lacan's heterodoxical concept of identification," Benesch explains that, “...the 
machinal Other of this story appears to be but a doubling and distorted image of the spectator, a 
direct product and brainchild of the humans' mind. Moreover, Deckard's attempt to stalk and 
finally detect the technological Other through a combination of projections and ‘gazing’ refers to 
the Lacanian emphasis on the gaze as marker of the child's fascination with his/her own mirror 
image” (Benesch 390). This means that Deckard slowly realizes that the androids are not just 
some technological Other that humanity has created for itself to use as we please, but that the 
androids are actually a reflection on humanity itself. Humanity, and specifically our protagonist 
Rick Deckard, can be just as emotionless, cold, and logical as the androids, which makes sense 
as humans created the androids in their own image. 
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As one might notice, the Voigt-Kampff test is can be extremely problematic, if it is 
assumed that all humans must answer the questions in a certain way, especially when many 
questions would result in the identification of most 21st century Americans as androids. One of 
the most detailed descriptions of the test resides in chapter five, where Deckard tests Rachael 
Rosen, who, as he has been led to believe, is the daughter of Eldon Rosen, the creator and CEO 
of the Rosen Association. In reality, Rachael is actually an advanced Nexus-6 android, much to 
Deckard’s astonishment. As Deckard asks Rachael the list of probing questions, “the reader may 
be surprised to discover that virtually all of the questions posed in the Voigt-Kampff test revolve 
around animals. Deckard confronts Rachael with vignettes centering on violence towards 
animals, such as a killing jar used by a butterfly collector, a bearskin rug, or a bullfight. These 
images of violence are intended to elicit a negative empathetic response” (Congdon 47). Yet, it 
must be noted that "[t]o the contemporary reader, however, many of the scenarios that are 
supposed to inspire horror from the average ‘human’ are everyday occurrences, such as calfskin 
wallets, boiling lobsters and fur coats" (Attaway 10). The reader may also see that an individual 
can answer the questions in a number of different ways, and it can be quite easy to manipulate 
the results of the test or be mistaken for an android if not responding the “correct” way. In the 
case of Rachael, “It is only due to Deckard's own intuition that Rachael is caught; the test itself 
fails to identify Rachael as an android” (Congdon 48). It seems that the Voigt-Kampff test, like 
the polygraph examination it closely resembles, is not a foolproof test, and that it can fail to 
detect what it is meant to detect. The test fails to see that individuals can react to these types of 
questions very differently, and that both humans and androids may not give the type of reaction 
that the machine and the examiner are looking for.  
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The failure of the Voigt-Kampff Test is with its parameters of how it distinguishes a 
human from an android, as an android can reasonably answer the questions in a manner 
consistent with human thought and logic but deem them not human because it does not elicit an 
empathic response. For example,  
  During her empathy test, when told about a banquet at which dog was served, 
 Luba responds, 'Nobody would kill and eat a dog.[...] They're worth a fortune' (103), a 
 non-empathic response that marks her as an android, but which is nonetheless consistent 
 with attitudes toward animals displayed by the human characters.  
  ... it is worth noting that most of Dick's audience would fail the Voigt-Kampff 
 test. Its questions--about topics such as boiling live lobster, eating meat, or using fur--
 denote things that are commonplace rather than shocking in our world. (Vint 114) 
Vint's analysis of the role of animals in the novel, the cold logic demonstrated by humans, and 
the instances of empathy shown by the androids all are important pieces of evidence that help 
support my hypothesis. It is only fair to determine that the empathy test is highly illogical and 
inconsistent with human nature. 
One aspect of humanity that the creators of the Voigt-Kampff test failed to see is "what 
passes for 'empathy' among humans derives far more from a cultural construction than from any 
categorical essence," and that the Voigt- Kampff test emphasizes the "contrived nature" of this 
human quality (Galvan 415). One can just see that different contemporary cultures around the 
world have different conventions of what is right and wrong when it comes to animals. While the 
consumption of cow meat is prevalent in western countries, it is a major taboo in India where 
cows are considered sacred animals. Most in the West would be horrified and never would think 
to eat dog meat, but many people in several Asian countries do eat dogs regularly.  
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Another factor is that the reader can just look at the thoughts and actions of the characters 
in the novel and notice that they do not follow the conventions of what humans and androids are 
supposed to act like. The human/android dichotomy is severely undermined when one realizes 
that Dick is never explicitly clear whether Deckard himself is really a human or an android. 
Though I do personally believe Deckard to be an android, the ambiguity of this idea, “that a 
fully-fleshed character like Deckard could be an android....is held up by the fact that the androids 
in the novel often act in an empathetic and ‘human’ way, despite the supposed hard-and-fast rule 
of the Voigt-Kampff test, and, conversely, that none of the human characters (except the 
‘chicken head’ Isidore) seem particularly empathetic” (Congdon 53). It seems as though Dick 
has placed this Voigt-Kampff machine in his novel, that is alike the polygraph in so many ways, 
as a commentary on trying to evaluate the thoughts and emotions of mankind by use of 
technology, which will always fall flat.  
The Voigt-Kampff Machine, therefore, “is Dick’s satirical comment on humans’ utter 
dependence on machines. They have allowed machines to come between them and the measure 
of true authenticity. Machines know humans better than humans know themselves. Human 
empathy...is reduced to a number” (Shaddox 209). In this way, humanity is trying to scrutinize 
the image they see in the mirror by the only means they know how: ironically, by use of 
machines. The androids that humans seem to be so afraid of are condemned to death if they dare 
set foot on Earth, yet humans not only depend on the androids to take care of them on Mars and 
the colony planets, but are utterly dependent on all kinds of technology, including the Voigt-
Kampff machine. In this way, the humans see their technological Other in the androids, and they 
fight to keep themselves separated from their mirror image. 
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Androids as Humanity’s Other 
For Deckard and the humans in Androids, their mirror image, their Other, is the androids 
the Rosen Corporation has created to serve humanity. The androids become so alike their human 
creators that they become that source of anxiety, fear, and scorn, so much so that androids have 
been banned from living on Earth and must remain slaves to their owners on the colony planets. 
The androids are seen as an Other, as the mirror image that humanity desperately struggles to 
live up to. This brings to mind a real-life phenomenon of a group that wants to separate 
themselves from another group, i.e. the enslavement of Africans in the New World and the 
consequences of this horrible reality in contemporary American society. In Irina-Ana Drobot's 
article "Flower-Power Tantra By Claudia Golea And Do Androids Dream Of Electric Sheep? By 
Philip K. Dick: Creating A Different Reality.", Flower-Power Tantra and Androids are 
compared and contrasted by the ways in which the texts help break our sense of what reality is 
and how the respective stories are told through these alternate realities. Specifically, Drobot 
delves into the nature of humans' relationship with the androids, and tells us how the androids are 
being treated as slaves and not as sentient beings with the ability to write their own destinies. 
This goes a little into critical race theory, as Drobot compares the humans' treatment of the 
androids to, "the problem of minorities. At some point, one android notices that even the animals 
have become protected by the law, that they have become sacred, while the androids are 
withdrawn, a word created to express their killing." (Drobot 43). It is easy to see how the 
androids are symbolic of real-life minorities in relation to Critical Race Theory, as “it [is] 
possible to illustrate how Dick develops the Other, particularly the robotic Other, as a means for 
effective social commentary, which is designed, in part, to reveal humanity’s limitations and 
imperfections; furthermore, this will demonstrate how Dick expertly crafts the dual nature of the 
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androids as a means of expressing the robotic Others‟ need for liberation, and how both the 
androids and the specials the author depicts symbolize the manifestation of the Others‟ desire for 
recognition and inclusion in this new post-human era” (Humphrey 26). Dick makes a note to say 
that the androids are treated as slaves that are killed for disobeying their masters and escaping 
from the enslavement; one cannot deny the parallels between the treatment of the androids in the 
novel and real-life African slaves. African slaves were dehumanized and seen only as property, 
and they too could be killed if they disobeyed their owners or tried to escape and find their own 
freedom. This adds one more layer to the sense of what being seen as an Other means, and that 
once the Other is found, humanity will try to devalue and change how that mirror image is seen 
to the world. Just as white American slave owners tried to dehumanize and separate themselves 
from being seen in anyway alike their African slaves, humanity too is devaluing and separating 
themselves from their android slaves. 
In the mirror stage theory, one’s image of themselves in the mirror can become a source 
of anxiety, fear, depression, denial, and of scorn, as one struggles with coming to terms with 
accepting that image as truly a reflection of oneself. Deckard experiences this anxiety on a deep 
personal level as he interacts with the androids more and more; he sees that the androids are not 
so different from humans, since he notices that they are in fact showing signs of empathy, unlike 
what humans believe to be true. In spite of the fact that it will cost him all of his reward money 
for retiring the six fugitive Nexus-6 androids, Deckard believes he must buy the “real” goat: 
"The expense, the contractual indebtedness, appalled him; he found himself shaking. But I had to 
do it, he said to himself. The experience with Phil Resch--I have to get my confidence, my faith 
in myself and my abilities, back. Or I won't keep my job" (Androids 148). This is when Deckard 
begins to question his own humanity, and feels that he needs to buy the goat in order to reaffirm 
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his own sense of self, his own belief that he is a human. Deckard needs to assert himself as a 
human “after he encounters various situations that call the distinction between [androids] and 
humans into question, and the only way he knows how to do that is to buy a real, authentic 
animal, to function as an external symbol of both his success and his reified empathy” (Congdon 
52). He fears the Other that he sees in the mirror through the interactions with the androids, and 
hopes that he is not one of them.  
What is ironic about this is that this may in fact be one of the best lines of evidence for 
Deckard actually being an android. Deckard’s fear that he is seeing his own reflection in the 
androids he retires is “one of the more poignant, though subtle, suggestions that Deckard may in 
fact be an android, and this is born out even by the wording used to describe his mental process” 
(Congdon 52-53). After seeing fellow bounty hunter Resch kill the androids with no ounce of 
remorse, Deckard’s anxious thoughts are described as follows: "Possibly his encounter with the 
bounty hunter Phil Resch had altered some minute synapsis in him, had closed one neurological 
switch and opened another. And this perhaps had started a chain reaction" (Androids 152). Here, 
through the phrases “minute synapsis,” “closed one neurological switch,” and “opened another 
[switch]” one can see how Dick is equating Deckard with the inner workings of a machine. In 
this way, Deckard’s conflict and self-doubt of his humanity is the best example of androids being 
the Other through which humanity scrutinizes in the mirror, as he himself might not even be a 
human like he would ideally want to be. 
 A theme that Dick continuously returns to throughout the text which define androids as 
humanity’s Other is the fact that not only androids are revealed to be empathetic, but that the 
humans are struggling with feeling genuine emotions. The androids are becoming more human-
like, while the humans are shown to be quite android-like; as the androids are shown having 
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empathy, there are several examples throughout the novel of humans failing to express empathy. 
This fact is not only shown through the actions of Phil Resch but also with Deckard and his wife 
Iran. Both Deckard and Iran seem dependent on a device called the Penfield Mood Organ, a 
machine that controls and adjusts the emotions of its users. Deckard uses the mood organ to 
wake himself up and make him feel better about doing his job as a bounty hunter, while Iran 
schedules herself a “six-hour self-accusatory depression” after observing all the empty 
apartments around them (Androids 2). Deckard argues with his wife about dialing in the 
depression and how she might stay in a depression due to feeling it so long from the mood organ. 
Iran responds that she needed to dial in the depression session as she “realized how unhealthy it 
was, sensing the absence of life, not just in this building but everywhere, and not reacting--do 
you see? ... But that used to be considered a sign of mental illness; they called it ‘absence of 
appropriate affect’” (Androids 3). The fact that Iran realizes that she isn’t “feeling” the way she 
should feel about all the empty apartments around them speaks to the idea that humans wish to 
set themselves apart from androids with their sense of empathy, and that she is seemingly acting 
in a way that humans believe androids to be. It is “ironic that Iran chooses to remedy her 
estrangement from real humanity by engaging in an artificially-induced emotion... her statement 
is revealing, since the 'absence of appropriate affect' which she feels--and which she indicates 
Deckard feels but is entirely unaware of--will later be identified as a defining characteristic of 
androids” (Congdon 42). Later, Deckard sees the irony in the fact that the androids seem to show 
more genuine emotion than even his own wife; as Deckard states, "Most androids I've known 
have more vitality and desire to live than my wife. She has nothing to give me" (Androids 83). 
Though Iran is acting particularly machine-like for a human, she seems to be more in tuned to 
herself, and sees that she is not empathetic when she thinks she should be.  
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Deckard, on the other hand, is particularly harsh with his thoughts of his wife throughout 
the novel, especially in the very beginning. He sees flaws in his wife that he is clueless as to not 
recognize many of the same flaws within himself – at first. In the beginning of the novel, 
Deckard is arrogant and self-centered, and seems blissfully unaware that he possesses many 
qualities that should be found in androids. For example, he criticizes his wife, and even thinks 
about divorcing her because she has “nothing to give” to him, he believes that taking care of an 
electric sheep is demoralizing and constantly thinks about buying a “real” animal with his bounty 
money, and he thinks about the retirement of the androids only in terms of financial gain. It is 
entirely hypocritical of Deckard to criticize his wife, his electric sheep, and the androids for 
lacking empathy when he lacks empathy as well. If we define humanity as empathetic beings 
above all else, then Rick Deckard does not seem to fit that definition of a human. His character 
growth in the novel models how the androids have begun to have a sense of empathy, which 
addresses the notion of Deckard being an android.  
 
Empathy Defines Humanity? 
The one defining trait that humans deem to set themselves apart from androids is having 
a sense of empathy. The human characters strive to be seen as empathetic and fear how cold and 
unfeeling the androids seem to be. Unlike how we humans may define ourselves as a species in 
our society today, in Androids, humanity does not distinguish themselves from other lifeforms by 
a higher intelligence, as one could argue that the androids have surpassed humans in that regard. 
"Empathy,” as believed by the humans, “existed only within the human community, whereas 
intelligence to some degree could be found throughout every phylum and order including the 
arachnida" (Androids 30-31). What is important for humans in Androids is how they treat others 
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and care for other living creatures, or at the very least, how they wish for others to perceive them 
as altruistic and empathetic. For Dick, “the key to being human... lies in kindness—in humane 
treatment of others—and this kindness can manifest itself in both heroic and noble efforts to help 
humankind and, at the other extreme, in small altruistic gestures made toward another being (and 
this second variety of kindness is the more common in Dick’s works)” (Link). Small altruistic 
gestures are how empathy manifests itself in Androids, exemplified with Deckard’s care for the 
artificial toad in the end. This small act of kindness is how humans define their existence, as 
“kindness is fueled by empathy: if one can empathize with others, one can understand their 
challenges, their shortcomings, their suffering” (Link). Therefore, a lack of empathy is what 
defines an android’s existence, or so the humans believe. Yet, as we have seen throughout the 
course of the novel, humans can lack empathy just as much as androids can possess it. Dick 
shows us through his work that without empathy, humanity may as well be machines without a 
soul. As Dick writes in his 1976 essay “Man, Android, and Machine,” a human being “without 
the proper empathy or feeling is the same as an android built so as to lack it, either by design or 
mistake. We mean, basically, someone who does not care about the fate that his fellow living 
creatures fall victim to; he stands detached, a spectator, acting out by his indifference.” What is 
important here is that living beings should be kind and care for one another, whether that be 
human or android.  
The main reason that humans use to justify the hunting down and killing of the androids 
is the supposed lack of empathy in the androids.  It is this idea that the humans hold-- that 
empathy is an inherent quality of humanity-- is called into question throughout the text: 
"[Humans] are distinguished by their ability to feel empathy. But is this really true? The novel 
seems to question this idea at some point. The hero, the bounty hunter, is determined to wonder 
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at some point whether he himself is not an android. How come that he can kill androids in cold 
blood? Did he do that psychological test himself?" (Drobot 43). Deckard’s identity of being 
human is shaken when he hunts down and retires the Nexus-6 androids, especially after Luba 
Luft hints at the notion that his memories "could be false memories, i.e. the memories of another, 
referring to psychology, Freudian psychoanalysis and all sorts of experiments, as is the case in 
the novel, with a generation of androids inside whose minds memories of human beings were 
introduced" (Drobot 43). This is evidence of the uncertainty of what qualifies as a measure of 
humanity that is seen as the truth, and further established by the parameters of the Voigt-Kampff 
test. Believing that empathy is the one factor for determining humanity is shown throughout the 
text to be problematic and unfounded. As we have seen many instances where androids are 
shown to possess empathy while humans seem to lack empathy and need devices like Empathy 
Boxes and Penfield Mood Organs to feel genuine emotions, the Voigt-Kampff machine and the 
line of questions that bounty hunters use for the test are inherently flawed. Congdon explains, 
“By identifying empathy as the one human trait that cannot be reproduced, Dick points to 
empathy as our most human, our most authentic, of characteristics. ...but it is problematized from 
the first page, even before the novel establishes empathy as the true mark of humanity, and is 
further exacerbated by the Voigt-Kampff test” (Congdon 51). So, can humanity really claim to 
have the monopoly on empathy?  
Why can’t the humans see that the androids are living beings too, but just built using 
different parts than humans? Why does humanity have such anxiety over society entering a 
posthumanist world where androids walk among humans as equals? It is so futile to try to 
differentiate humans from androids, since both are alike in almost every way. Humans can be 
cold, heartless, and prone to violence at times, and these qualities can be just as intrinsic to a 
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human's life as it is to an android. Jill Galvan's article "Entering the Posthuman Collective in 
Philip K. Dick's Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?" addresses many different aspects of 
posthumanism within the novel, including the evolution of humanity, the blending of nature with 
technology, and the search for the self within in the twenty-first century. She explains that,  
The electronic image brings this question to the fore, and further it reveals the firm 
boundaries of the human collective as wholly fictional. Dick's human characters naively 
pride themselves on their empathic unity and derogate technological constructs as 
inherently secondary to biological ones... Yet as we have seen, machines have not only 
infiltrated the human collective, but have also become an integral part of the 
establishment—an ineradicable element of human day-to-day existence. (Galvan 418) 
Many scholars believe that life in the twenty-first century will be one of Posthumanism, and that 
the biological will be integrated with the technological. Dick's Do Androids Dream of Electric 
Sheep? demonstrates just how much that is a true statement. 
 When delving deep into the novel’s conflict with the concept of empathy, one begins to 
see that it is actually 
...[the] human characters in the novel [that] work to undermine the concept of a 
transcendent or pure human quality. One of the most problematic characters, for Deckard, 
is Phil Resch, a bounty hunter whom he briefly comes to believe is an android. He is 
convinced of Resch's inhumanity by the cool calculation of his demeanor--in a sense, he 
shows the lack of appropriate affect. It is Resch himself who begins to conclude that he 
might be an android (111), and Deckard is so appalled by the fact that Resch enjoys 
killing that he doubts the other bounty hunter's humanity (120). (Congdon 51)   
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When Resch takes the Voigt-Kampff test and the test determines that he is human, Deckard is 
quite shocked at the results, as Resch has a complete lack of empathy towards the androids. For 
Resch, this is not a problem, but Deckard realizes that he is beginning to feel empathy for the 
androids. He soon asks Resch if he believes androids have souls, but soon realizes that the 
problem lies not with Resch, but with himself. Deckard has an epiphany: "I'm capable of feeling 
empathy for at least specific, certain androids ... There's nothing unnatural or unhuman about 
Phil Resch's reactions; it's me" (Androids 124). Deckard sees that feeling empathy for the 
androids is what is not normal in his society, as humans ordinarily do not feel anything for them. 
Several of the androids that Deckard encounters throughout the novel, particularly 
Rachael Rosen, Pris Stratton, and Roy and Irmgard Baty, seem to possess empathetic qualities, 
or at the very least, seem to be emotional and human-like, which is in sharp contrast to many of 
the humans. Pris first introduces Isidore to Roy and Irmgard Baty as her “best friends” and 
Isidore assumes she is a human (Androids 130). Another strong indication of the androids’ 
capacity for empathy is the fact that Roy and Irmgard consider themselves to be husband and 
wife, and Roy cries out in sorrow for Irmgard when Deckard kills her. This act compels Deckard 
to “accept that Roy, an [android], is capable of love, even though love, presumably, requires 
empathy. Furthermore, Rick acknowledges the relationship between the two by referring to 
Irmgard as "Mrs. Baty," a categorization that would be off-limits to [androids]. This is no doubt 
due to the action of the novel, which has deconstructed the binary of human and android to the 
extent that Deckard himself no longer believes in the firm distinction” (Congdon 54). These are 
just a few of the examples found in the novel of the androids contradicting the notion that 
humans are the ones who feel empathy, while the opposite can be said of the humans. 
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Though not only are humans more like androids in their lack of empathy at times and the 
use of technology in their everyday lives, but the reverse is also shown to be true; androids can 
be just as empathic as humans, since "a few of the androids Rick deals with exhibit what appears 
to be caring for their own kind and even, in some cases, for the humans with whom they 
interact." (Galvan 414). Galvan here is particularly referring to when Deckard comes home to 
find his newly bought biological goat has been killed by Rachael. The reason she did it is not 
stated, but we can certainly speculate, and all the reasons point to Rachael having some strong 
emotions in order to commit the act in the first place. Galvan further speculates: “[Deckard] 
returns home to discover that Rachael has pushed [his] goat off the roof. Why? Because she is 
jealous of his love for the goat, or in revenge for his killing her friends...? Whichever 
interpretation one chooses, the action is not consistent with the official picture of android 
psychology, which like Dick's essays insists that androids are incapable of feeling loyalty or 
indeed feeling anything at all” (Galvan 415). If the Voigt-Kampff machine could analyze the 
androids’ actions in those instances, then, "the scenarios that Rick proffers to his android 
suspects would not, should they generate an apathetic response, differentiate androids from 
modern Americans." (Galvan 415). Not only do the humans act like androids, but the androids 
also act like humans. So, are humans and androids so different? Mankind’s mission in trying to 
distinguish humans from androids is a futile effort. The androids do have empathy and resemble 
human fallacies regardless of what the humans might want to believe. Like Lacan’s Theory of 
the Mirror Stage, humans may not like what they see while looking at the androids (their mirror 
image), but it is certainly not a false image. Humans are capable of great compassion, but also at 
times can resemble cold, unfeeling, killing machines. It seems that Dick is showing us a future in 
which humans are destined to incorporate technology more and more into their lives, to the point 
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that humans and androids are indistinguishable from one another, despite humans remaining in 
denial of this fact. Androids “repudiates the idea of a confined human community and envisions 
a community of the post human, in which human and machine commiserate and co materialize, 
vitally shaping one another's existence" (Galvan 414). 
 
Conclusion 
 Whether or not Dick had Lacan's Mirror Stage Theory in mind, consciously or 
subconsciously, while writing his novel or not, one cannot dispute that there does seem to be a 
parallel between Lacan’s work on the mirror stage and Dick’s groundbreaking novel. I believe 
that my findings have only scratched the surface of what philosophical, psychoanalytical, and 
posthumanist insights one can find in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?. Dick's beloved 
science fiction classic novel's importance is still vital in our continual search for answering 
questions of identity: what being human really is, if empathy really is a defining characteristic of 
humanity, and the role technology has on us as a society and as individuals in the future. We 
have always sought out the questions brought up in the novel, and Dick in particular “was 
perennially interested in the question, what makes a human human? From his earliest short 
stories forward, Dick separates the question of what is human from issues of mere biology, and, 
as a result, manufactured artifacts, robots, and even aliens can be more human than those 
individuals who—although biologically human—are driven by anti-humanistic motivations (and, 
at the most extreme, can be possessed or driven by pure metaphysical evil itself)” (Link). From 
the original novel, to the two film adaptations of Androids, 1982’s Blade Runner and 2017’s 
Blade Runner 2049, these philosophical questions are still being explored to this day. It is my 
hope that my research into the novel through the lens of Lacan’s Mirror Stage Theory can 
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contribute to this continuing dialogue that Philip K. Dick’s work inspires in us; I hope for us to 
see our true selves, beyond the image that we see in the mirror, just as Rick Deckard did. 
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